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ABSTRACT
Mobile technologies have the potential to improve patient monitoring, medical decision
making and in general the efficiency and quality of health delivery. They also pose new
security and privacy challenges. The objectives of this work are to (i) Explore and define
security and privacy requirements on the example of a post-surgical care application, and
(ii) Develop and test a pilot implementation Post-Surgical Care Studies of surgical out-
comes indicate that timely treatment of the most common complications in compliance
with established post-surgical regiments greatly improve success rates. The goal of our
pilot application is to enable physician to optimally synthesize and apply patient directed
best medical practices to prevent post-operative complications in an individualized pa-
tient/procedure specific fashion. We propose a framework for a secure protocol to enable
doctors to check most common complications for their patient during in-hospital post-
surgical care. We also implemented our construction and cryptographic protocols as an
iPhone application on the iOS using existing cryptographic services and libraries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A secure model for electronic health records is needed for current hospital health systems.
As the mobile-phone becomes the main communication tool for doctors and patients, a
secure and privacy-preserving model/framework is required for such a mobile system.
1.1 Background
Significant attention is now being given to organized assessment and reporting of quality
of medical care across the United States, and this focus on quality will continue to play
an ever more important role in patient care delivery. Patient outcomes following surgery
are receiving particular scrutiny because of the attendant risks and increasing volumes of
surgical procedures. For instance, some payments to hospitals are linked to outcomes and
quality measures and there are already 8-9 events for which insurance does not reimburse
hospitals no matter what happens to the patient. The American College of Surgeons
(ACS) has adopted the National Surgical Quality Improvement Program (NSQIP http://
www.acsnsqip.org/main/aboutacs/about_overview.jsp ), that tracks observed versus
expected ratios for participating hospitals on a semi-annual basis. Other benchmarking
approaches are in active discussion and development (http://www.acssurgery.com/acs/
chapters/ch0003.htm).
2Although each surgical procedure has its unique set of possible complications, there are a
number of common complications that occur in the post-operative period. These include
wound infection, venous thromboembolism (VTE), urinary tract infection, pneumonia,
and myocardial infarction. While the number of these common complications is relatively
small (typically 6-7) their prevention will have a large effect on outcomes and the quality
of health care. There is a body of scientific evidence that links certain medical practices
with decreased likelihood of post-operative complications. For instance, the incidence of
VTE can be diminished with appropriate chemoprophylaxis, pneumatic compression boots,
and patient mobilization. Unfortunately, compliance with post-operative regimens is often
suboptimal due to a number of hospital and patient factors. Increasing work and time
pressures have made it difficult for physicians to optimally synthesize and apply patient
directed best medical practices to prevent post-operative complications in an individu-
alized patient/procedure specific fashion. Although pre-operative checklists have become
accepted practice in the operating room, such checklists and their optimal application have
not been successfully translated into the post-operative arena.
One proposed solution on calculating the maximum likelihood post-surgical complications
is to create an individualized risk profile in patients undergoing surgery. This profile takes
into account significant elements of a patient’s past medical history, records of the present
illness, and the problems associated surgical procedure performed. Also, it is typically
linked to the Electronic Medical Records (EMR) system. We incorporate all relevant data
into a patient’s medical identifier chip, and all relevant data will then be updated to the
patient’s EMR. Next, a wireless connection will occur between the surgeon’s handheld de-
vice/phone and the patient’s identifier on daily rounds. At that time, a checklist will appear
on the surgeon’s wireless device/phone. This checklist will be patient/procedure specific
and succinct. The surgeon will address specific issues that need to be taken into account
to minimize the possibility of post-operative complications. The surgeon’s responses will,
in a wireless fashion, communicate with the EMR and lead to appropriate orders being
3generated.
1.2 Overview of the secure mobile application
Recently, issues related to database security and privacy have attracted increased atten-
tion, and many database applications can preserve privacy of both server and client. The
technique of Differential Privacy has already been applied to data publication [4, 20, 22],
counting queries [15, 21], histogram queries [8], log queries [9], and spatial data queries [5].
Furthermore, there are some recent works on applying differential privacy to time series
databases [19, 18]. The objective of both these papers focuses on answering aggregated
information from time series databases. For an exact match, especially for queries on
particular medical records, differential privacy is not easy to apply since it is defined for
statistical queries on databases. More importantly, the practical implementation of differ-
ential privacy seems difficult for mobile phone software systems. On the other hand, for
exact queries, recent work utilizes applied cryptographic techniques such as private infor-
mation retrieval [16] and oblivious transfer [17]. On our side, we note that it will be easier
if we can build a mobile application using some heavy cryptographic techniques. However,
considering the practical issues, one needs to consider the mobile phone’s computational
capability, power consumptions and other resources.
As mobile devices are convenient and easy to use, mobile health services can be provided via
a phone that is capable of capturing patient information, images of patient symptoms, as
well as a patient’s audio information. Patient information transmitted through the system
is uploaded to a secure, web-based medical record system, where doctors can provide remote
medical advice, and automated algorithms can help determine patient risk profiles for a
host of ailments, schedule clinic appointments and improve preventative care.
While there are significant opportunities to leverage these devices to increase the effective-
4ness of mobile workers, there are also significant concerns about the privacy of sensitive
data stored on the devices that IT must handle. We propose a framework, more specifi-
cally, a protocol for doctors to check all the necessary complications for their patient during
post-surgery care. Specifically, a wireless connection will occur between the surgeon’s hand-
held device/phone and the patient’s identifier on daily rounds. At that time, a checklist
will appear on the surgeon’s wireless device/phone. The surgeon will address specific is-
sues that need to be taken into account to minimize the possibility of a post-operative
complication, and the surgeon’s responses will, in a wireless fashion, communicate with
the electronic medical record (EMR) and lead to appropriate orders being generated and
treatment carried out.
Consider the following scenario: Suppose doctor Alice wants to check all types of complica-
tions for her patient Bob from a hospital’s database. She must acquire all necessary fields
and information and pass them to an existing “expert system”, which will compute all
related complications. Doctor Alice, on the other hand, will make a judgment of the com-
plications, and she will also be able to update relevant decisions to Bob’s medical records in
the hospital’s database. Due to the sensitivity of the health records, data sharing and third
party computation require confidentiality and privacy. Although the potential benefits of
the ‘eHealth’ mobile phone include better post-surgery service, time saving, efficient com-
munication, and reduced cost, many privacy and security challenges arise in the system.
Before we address the security model and privacy issues, we first posit some assumptions
about the environment: 1). The central database system must be maintained by the hos-
pital, namely, we may not use some other service from a third party since these may cause
problems with trustworthyness and privacy-preservation. 2). The wireless communication
between mobile devices will be totally unprotected. Thus, we must consider attacks such
as ‘man-in-the-middle’ attack for our system.
The framework we proposed will be a secure and efficient protocol that enables the system
to provide the confidential and integrated data to the doctor. Furthermore, our system
5must avoid the exposure of the data to unauthorized parties while protecting the data
from tampering. On the other hand, we also need to minimize communication overhead
and computation by both server and client.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Throughout the presentation, we will freely use some cryptographic notations [10] for our
security analysis.
Definition 2.0.1. A function f is negligible if for every polynomial p(·) there exists an N
such that for all integers n > N it holds that f(n) < 1/p(n).
An equivalent formulation of the above is to require that for all constants c there exists
an N such that for all n > N it holds that f(n) < n−c. We typically denote an arbitrary
negligible function by negl.
Definition 2.0.2. A private-key encryption scheme is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithms (Gen,Enc,Dec) such that:
1. The key-generation algorithm Gen takes as input the security parameter 1n and out-
puts a key k; we write this as k ← Gen(1n). We will assume without loss of generality
that any key k output by Gen(1n) satisfies |k| ≥ n.
2. The encryption algorithm Enc takes as input a key k and a plaintext message m ∈
{0, 1}∗, and outputs a ciphertext c. We write this as c← Enck(m), since Enc may be
randomized.
3. The decryption algorithm Dec takes as input a key k and a ciphertext c, and outputs
a message m. We assume without loss of generality that Dec is deterministic, and so
7write this as Deck(c) = m.
It is required that for every n, every key k output by Gen(1n), and every m ∈ {0, 1}∗,
it holds that Deck(Enck(m)) = m. We will use the IND-CPA (indistinguishable chosen-
plaintext-attack) to denote the security of a encryption scheme, which is defined as follows:
for a probabilistic polynomial time (ppt) adversary, given the oracle access of the encryption
oracle, the adversary can query the encryption function algorithm Enck(·) polynomial many
times. The adversary will then choose two messages m0 and m1 and send them to the
challenger, and the challenger will flip a bit b ← {0, 1} and send the adversary c∗ ←
Enck(mb). By seeing the challenge ciphertext c
∗, the adversary will output a bit b′ and
wins if b = b′. We say the scheme is IND-CPA-secure for all ppt adversary, if probability
that the adversary can win the CPA game is no greater than half plus a negligible function
in the security parameter n. For CCA-secure (chosen-ciphertext attack), in addition to the
oracle access of Enc, the adversary also gets the oracle access to Dec. Semantic Security
(SEM) was first proposed by Goldwasser and Micali [6]. It captures the idea that a secure
encryption scheme should hide all information about an unknown plaintext. This definition
may match our intuition about what secure encryption ought to achieve better than does
IND-CPA. It has been shown [1] that the IND-CPA implies SEM-CPA. We note that in
our practical implementation of the protocol, it suffices to use the CCA-secure encryption
scheme to provide the confidentiality of our data, while the encryption scheme also prevents
the data being tampered in the mean time.
2.1 Cryptographic Primitives
This section reviews other cryptographic primitives used throughout this presentation.
82.1.1 Message Authentication Codes
A message authentication code, or MAC, is a short piece of information used to protect a
messages integrity and authenticity. While anyone can generate a hash of a given value, a
MAC assumes that the generator and the verifier share a common secret. The MAC algo-
rithm accepts as input a secret key and an arbitrary-length message to be authenticated,
and generates a MAC as output.
Definition 2.1.1. A message authentication code (MAC) is a function h : K ×M → R.
Here K is called the key space K = {0, 1}k, M = {0, 1}∗ is the message space, and R =
{0, 1}n is the range for some n ≥ 1.
To authenticate a messagem, an entity with a pre-shared key, say k′, computes MACk′(m) =
(m, t), where t is the tag (a checksum) on m. To verify (m, t), a different entity owning the
same pre-shared key k′ checks that MACk′(m) does indeed equal (m, t). The main idea of
the MAC is that an adversary without the knowledge of the key should be unable to forge a
valid tag for a given message that has not yet been authenticated. A MAC must therefore
be able to resist adaptive chosen-plaintext attacks in order to be considered secure. This
implies that no two messages m and m′ should yield the same MAC under some unknown
key. Message authentication codes share some similarities with conventional encryption,
for instance in the way that communicating parties need a prior established shared key.
However, the key is only used in a one-way function which build on the difficulty of comput-
ing certain mathematical primitives. This makes the MAC less vulnerable to attacks than
regular encryption. For a more comprehensive review of cryptographic MAC algorithms
and hash functions, see [10].
92.1.2 Digital Signature
Digital signature schemes allow a signer S who has established a public key pk to “sign”
a message in such a way that any other party who knows pk (and knows that this public
key was established by S) can verify that the message originated from S and has not been
modified in any way. Signature schemes can be viewed as the public-key counterpart of
message authentication codes, though there are some important differences as we will see
below. The algorithm that the sender applies to a message is now denoted Sign (rather
than MAC), and the output of this algorithm is now called a signature (rather than a tag).
The algorithm that the receiver applies to a message and a signature in order to verify
legitimacy of the message is denoted Vrfy. We now formally define the syntax of a digital
signature scheme.
Definition 2.1.2. A signature scheme is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms
(Gen, Sign,Vrfy) satisfying the following:
1. The key-generation algorithm Gen takes as input a security parameter 1n and outputs
a pair of keys (pk, sk).We assume for convenience that pk and sk each have length
at least n, and that n can be determined from pk, sk.
2. The signing algorithm Sign takes as input a private key sk and a message m from
some underlying message space (that may depend on pk). It outputs a signature σ,
and we write this as σ ← Signsk(m).
3. The deterministic verification algorithm Vrfy takes as input a public key pk, a message
m, and a signature σ. It outputs a bit b, with b = 1meaning valid and b = 0 meaning
invalid. We write this as b← Vrfypk(m,σ).
We require that for every n, every (pk, sk) output by Gen(1n), and every message m in
the appropriate underlying plaintext space, it holds that Vrfypk(m,Signsk(m)) = 1. The
security of the digital signature is that, for a ppt adversary who trying to break the scheme,
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given the pk the adversary can ask polynomial many signatures of his choice give the oracle
access of Signsk(·). The adversary will finally output a forged pair (m,σ), where m has not
been queried to the signing oracle. We say the signature scheme is unforgeable under an
adaptive chosen-message attack if for all ppt adversary, the probability of the adversary
forging a signature is negligible.
Together with the CPA-secure and CCA-secure encryption scheme, the MAC and digi-
tal signature are the main tools that we’ll use for building the secure channel for the
communication between the doctor and the hospital’s database during the post-surgical
phase.
Chapter 3
The Security of the Post-Surgical Care
Consider the following scenario: Suppose doctor Alice wants to check all possible types of
complications for her patient Bob from a hospital’s databases. She must query all necessary
fields and information and pass them to an existing “expert system”. The “expert system”
will compute all related complications. The doctor Alice, on the other hand, will then make
a judgment as to the complications and she will also send an update of relevant decision to
Bob’s medical record in the hospital’s database. Due to the sensitivity of the health records,
data sharing and third party computation require confidentiality and privacy.
3.1 The environment
The potential ‘eHealth’ softphone has many potential benefits, including better post-
surgery service, time saving, efficient communication, and reduced cost. However, the
system requires many privacy and security challenges. Before we address the security
model and privacy issues, we first will state some assumption about the environment: 1).
The central database system must be maintained by the hospital, namely, we may not
use some other service from a third party since it may give rise to problems regarding the
trustworthyness and privacy-preserations. 2). The wireless communication between the
mobile device will be assumed totally unprotected. Thus, we must consider the possibility
of ‘man-in-the-middle’ attacks on our system.
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3.2 The Threat Model and The Security of The Protocol
We study the model where a malicious doctor/user want to learn some data entires from
the database. In this case, authentication needs to be added to both our server and our
client side. We note that in this threat model a malicious participant in the protocol will
not gain any information about the EMR. We can prevent the malicious user from doing
this by adding credential logins from the application itself. Health workers or doctors
are authenticated via password and required to change their credentials on a monthly or
weekly basis. Any read/write actions on a record are recorded with user ID and cannot
be deleted. Reports are run on a regular basis to look for suspect access patterns. More
generally, we study the man-in-the-middle threat model. The wireless connection between
the doctor and the database can be exposed to other parties, who may be able to see all the
transmitted message in the clear. Therefore, the man-in-the-middle threat model needs to
be considered. A doctor who needs all necessary data from the electronic medical record
will preform the computation on relevant complications to his/her patient. No other third
party should be able to know the patient’s record data. Our protocol should provide a
secure communication between the doctor and the database. A malicious user can try to
learn some portion of the data by seeing the messages in the clear. On the other hand, we
also require authentication and identity-protection for the secure communication. Lastly,
in the system security level, all plaintext will be stored in the softphone using a standard
hash function, e.g. SHA-256. Namely, all the hash values will be stored in the softphone’s
memory addresses. We only consider the case where our mobile device is protected by
the health worker, and it is secure in the system level. In practice, we note that our
implementation on the iPhone uses the hash function to ‘hash’ the identifier of the patient,
or the password if we will use the password-authenticated setting, which will be mentioned
in the following sections.
Therefore, the general strategies for the attacker to acquire the sensitive information are the
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following: When seeing the messages in the clear, the adversary tries to infer the medical
records for some entries in the database; the adversary tries to ‘break into’ the hospital’s
database; or the adversary tries to comprise possible users/doctors in the system. We’ll
provide the formal security analysis in the section 3.5.
3.3 The Post-Surgical secure protocol/application
To enable the system to provide the confidential and integrated data to the doctor, our
system must avoid the exposure of the data to other unauthorized parties while protecting
the data from tampering. On the other hand, we also need to minimize communication
overhead and the computation of both server and client. A secure channel is a communi-
cation that provides confidentiality and integrity to the communication between parties.
Due to the sensitivity of the EMR, we certainly need to establish a secure channel for the
communication between the doctor and the hospital’s database. We need the doctor to
initiate a secure channel to the hospital’s DB. Canetti and Krawczyk [2] showed how to
build a secure channel. Specifically,
Theorem 3.3.1. [2] If Enc is a symmetric encryption scheme secure in the sense of IND-
CPA and MAC is a secure then method Encrypt-then-Authenticate (Enc, MAC) implements
secure channels.
Theorem 3.3.1 provides a construction to building a secure channel. Numerous construc-
tions of CPA-secure encryption have been built based on some well-known hardness results,
e.g. the Discrete-Log, RSA. Our medical records will be sent through the secure channel
that has been built between the a client/doctor and the server. As stated in the previous
section, the secure channel will provide not only the confidentiality of the encrypted data,
but also the integrity and authenticity of the data. One important aspect that we are using
in this strong security tool is that we are trying to prevent the data from tampering while
protecting its confidentiality.
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3.4 The Secure Communication on the Complication Calculation
Doctor Alice will first initialize the protocol by getting the patient’s ID from the sensor
(e.g. scanning the a barcode using the iPhone or some other mobile device). Assume that
the symmetric encryption scheme (Enc,Dec) is IND-CPA secure, and thatthe asymmetric
encryption scheme (Enc′,Dec′) is IND-CCA secure.
A patient typically has a unique Patient ID, denoted p.id, on his/her wristband. We
may consider that this unique id number corresponds to the primary id in the hospital’s
database. Also, for security, we assume this phase is the face-to-face communication, thus
no attacker can ‘steal’ the id at this time. The stored id is in Alice’s mobile phone for
future inquiry. We denote the patient’s id to be Cp.id.
Alice will first initiate a ‘handshake’ with the DB, moreover, mutual authentication and key
exchange will be done between Alice and the central DB. A ‘Session’ is a local procedure
maintained by one party’s activation of the protocol. A party, either of the client(doctor) or
the server(DB), locally instantiates a run of the protocol and produces outgoing messages
and processes incoming messages. A unique identifier can be assigned for each session
maintained by both the doctor and the DB. This identifier can be derived from the system
timestamp, patient’s care time-clock, etc. We’ll use the Sigma Key Exchange (Σ-KE)
protocol proposed by [14] to derive some session keys, which implicitly achieving the mutual
authentication. Let sid denote the session identifier for a communication activated by doctor
Alice. Alice will generate a random x, and send s, gx to the database. Upon, receiving
s, gx, the DB will send s, gy, idDB,MACK1(s, idDB), SIGDB(s, gx, gy) back to Alice. Alice
will then send s, idAlice,MACK1(s, idAlice, gx), SIGAlice(s, gy, gx) to the DB.
Both Alice and DB will generate some session keys using the shared seed (gxy). This
could be done using the Pseudorandom Functions (PRF), a family of functions {fk} that
are indistinguishable from truly random function, i.e. fgxy(0), fgxy(1), ..., etc. We can use
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padding to pad the id with different strings in order to make the input for the PRFs be
the equal length.
Alice will produce a triple (x, y, z) where x = Enc′pk(aliceid, sessionid), y = EncKe(cid),
z = MACKa(aliceid, y). On receiving the message (x′, y′, z′), the server DB will have a
function to verify the uniqueness of message ‘identifier’ Dec′sk(x′) and the validity of the
MAC tag (computed on (x, y)); if the tag checks succeed, y′ is then decrypted under key
Ke and the resultant plaintext accepted as a valid query cid.
Upon receiving the decrypted query, the DB should be able to return the necessary fields
to the doctor using the same key derived from the KE phase, and thus initiate another
communication to the client(Alice). Also, the protocol may use a digital signature to
verify the integrity of the content, i.e. SIGSK(m), where m is the messages that have been
sent.
After all the necessary fields passed to the mobile device, the “expert system” will then com-
pute the likelihood of the relevant complications for this patient. Alice, at this point, should
be able to make a decision for a treatment to Bob. Moreover, the new decision/treatment
will then be sent back to the corresponding medical record in the hospital’s DB. Relevant
content written up to the DB will be encrypted using the previous key (from the KE phase);
also a signature will be appended to this decision for the DB’s verification.
3.5 Security Analysis
We give an overview of how our protocol accomplishes the security goal of protecting the
patient’s information, i.e. confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. For each interaction
between the doctor and the hospital’s database, we will consider the a ‘session’ as stated
in section 3.4. The key exchange part will implicitly achieve mutual authentication where
the two parties will hold a shared key which looks ‘random’ to the adversary in the middle.
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Sessions are denoted by the name of the party holding the session and a session identifier.
Here we simplify our presentation by implicitly referring to matching sessions as those
that have the same session identifier. In practice this requires that parties create session
identifiers interactively(before or during the KE run). Specifically, we assume the common
practice where (as part of the protocol) A sends to B a value sidA, B sends to A a value
sidB, and they both define the session identifier as s = (sidA; sidB). We the say the
protocol achieves mutual authentication secrecy if the following the two properties are
satisfied:
1. Except with negligible probability, the client(doctor) and the server(Database) will
agree on a shared secret key for a unique session identifier.
2. Given the truly random key and the shared session key, there is no probabilistic
polynomial adversary who can distinguish the session key from the truly random key
with probability greater than half plus negligible.
We will refer the reader to the rigorous proofs for the KE protocol in [2, 3].
Once a shared key is established, the client and the server can start the conversation us-
ing the CCA-secure symmetric encryption, where the symmetric keys are derived from
the shared key in the KE phase. As we claimed in Theorem 3.3.1, an encryption-then-
authentication can build a secure channel, which is essentially a CCA-secure symmetric
authenticated encryption. Therefore, the information we send in the clear has been fully
protected, and there’s a negligible probability that a ppt adversary can infer any infor-
mation from this protocol assuming the underlying assumptions (such as Diffe-Hellman,
digital signature, MAC) holds.
In addition, we also give another theoretical approach for this protocol. As the users
in this system need credentials to login, we consider the client and the server may use
the ‘password’ to initiate a communication. Therefore, we consider the password-based-
17
Figure 3.1: The communication protocol b/w doctor and the database
authenticated key exchange (pake) in this approach. Both the server and the client now
possess a secret ‘password’. Specifically, the client will have a password associated with
him/her, and the server has the corresponding password associated with his client main-
tained in the database. The server and the client will now agree on a shared key using
the the pre-shared ‘password’. From the adversary’s point of view, for each session the
shared key will be totally fresh and random to him. For an adversary (man-in-the-middle),
the security of the pake is resistant to off-line dictionary attacks, i.e. any adversary who
tries to enumerate the computation to guess the password off-line will fail in distinguish-
ing the session shared key from random. Since passwords are chosen from a small space,
an adversary can always try each possibility one at a time in an impersonation (on-line)
attack. Thus, we say a protocol is secure (informally) if this exhaustive guessing is the
best an adversary can do. For a real-world adversary, such on-line attacks are the hardest
to mount, and they are also the easiest to detect. It is very realistic to assume that the
number of on-line attacks an adversary is allowed is severely limited, while other attacks
(eavesdropping, off-line password guessing) are not. There have been many settings pro-
posed for building pake ([12, 7, 13, 11]), and here we just mention that pake would be a
possible way for the client/doctor and the Database to bootstrap a high-entropy shared
key using their pre-shared password.
Chapter 4
Deployment on a iOS device
We implements our secure protocol on the iOS platform, currently, the app can be run under
iOS 6.0. Suppose doctor Alice wants to check all of the most likely complications for her
patient (see Fig. 4.2). Alice must acquire the significant data in the patient’s record from
the hospital’s DataBase (DB). She uses this data to compute the complication(s) using an
existing ’expert’ system app on her phone. The application will produce a checklist which
appears on the surgeon’s wireless device (see Fig. 4.3). Alice will then address specific issues
that need to be acted on to minimize the effects of the post-operative complication(s). Her
responses will, in a seamless and wireless fashion, communicate with the electronic medical
record (EMR) and lead to appropriate orders being generated (see Fig. 4.4b). Alice will
finally commit to her decision on the specific complications. She will update the patient’s
EMR on the hospital’s DB.
Data Structures
PatientCoreData: PatientCoreData class is used to hold the data. When a patient’s data
has been ‘scanned’ to the phone, we convert this data entry into the PatientCoreData type
on the phone. PatientCoreData is the basic data structure where we hold the patient’s
information. The complication calculation will get access to this data, therefore, conduct
the computation.
ExpertSystem: The patient data will then be passed to the expert system. The ‘expert
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Figure 4.1: Prompt Patient ID View
Figure 4.2: List of Patient View
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Figure 4.3: Patient’s Complication View
system’ will calculate the post-surgical risk level for the patient. Currently, the dvtRiskCal-
culator maintains a sample complication calculation for Deep Vein Thrombosis. Its iden-
tifiers are Age, Gender, BMI, Walking, Congestive Heart Failure. Risk Levels are Low,
Medium, High.
PatientInit : We use the AlertView in the iOS to detect the input of the patient id p.id.
When a doctor inputs some p.id , the button action listener will call the PatientInit to ini-
tialize the connection between the iPhone and the server. Several cryptographic classes and
methods are being used in this phase. The connection will then send out the authentication
encrypted query to the server. The server side will verify the message authenticated code
and decrypt the ciphertext based on the established shared key (see section 3.4). (We use
the CommonCrypto.m form iOS and OpenSSL to implement the encryption scheme.)
Views: We only present a sample TVC complication view for this presentation, while
other complications views are very similar to the one presented.
PatientInformationTVC : Displays the patient information as queried from the database
where dictionary keys are table section headers and the object for the key is displayed in
the cell. It controls one of the views of the tab controller segued from PatientTableView-
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(a) Complication View (b) Write Decision
Figure 4.4: Doctor’s decision to the patient’s complication will added to the Database
Controller. The controller does not initiate any segues.
PatientTableViewController : Controller for the view that displays the listing of patients
stored in coredata. Subclass of CoreDataTableViewController which controls much of the
interaction with the coreData model. Also implements editing and adding of patients to
the database. This controller contains the ExpertSystem model by which patients are
initialized. Main view of the application and segues to the tab view (no explicit controller)
which contains PatientInformationTVC and ComplicationTVC
ComplicationTVC : Displays (Fig. 4.3) the patient’s complications as calculated by the
expert system. Each complication is represented by one cell. It controls one of the views
of the tab controller segued from PatientTableViewController. The controller initiates the
segue to TreatmentTVC view.
The Medical Record Database: For completeness, we have used a simple database to
test our implementation. The database was written in MySQL on the server. We have the
following main figure (4.5) mainly for the post-surgical database: patient comps history,
patient comps, patient data). The iPhone app will first interact with the Fig( 4.5c) (the
patient information) table to retrieve the patient’s information. When all the data securely
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(a) Comp. History Table (b) Patient Comps. (c) Patients
Figure 4.5: DataBase Tables
Figure 4.6: Communication time on local machine between iPhone and Java Server
passed to the app, the app will perform the computation and show the result to the surgery
professionals and wait for the professional to update the complication decision. Then, the
app’s expert system will securely update the complications tables (Fig 4.5a, 4.5b) in the
patient’s medical records.
4.1 Performance
We tested our program on the local machine (MacPro with 2.2 GHz Intel Core i7) using
the local Xcode iPhone simulator and a JAVA Server to control the sample database.
The performance (Fig 4.6) shows that the actual communication time between the iPhone
simulator and the server is very fast, mainly because the communication takes place in
the same machine. On the other hand, we note that the cryptographic techniques that
has been deployed in this protocol do not significantly increase the communication time
overhead. (The practical cryptographic tools we use here are AES256 for encryption and
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HMAC-SHA256 for authentication. Fig .4.6 fluctuates mainly because the machine CPU
may be busy with some other local jobs.)
Chapter 5
Open problems and Future work
We’ll address future work and several open problems in this section.
Our main concern in this thesis is the security aspects of the medical record. We provide
a protocol for protecting the medical data using current cryptographic tools. However,
in our implementation of this app on iPhone, the expert system has not been fully de-
signed. Current solution and analyzation on different types of complications should be
well-embedded into the expert system. As we are not medical surgical expert, we will
leave the ‘expert system’ as a part of the open and future work for the medical experts
and researchers. Also, it’ll be more interesting to address of role-based access to the EMR
data. One can use the cryptographic protocol based on attribute-based encryption (ABE).
We note the reader that ABE will be quite useful when doctors gaining different informa-
tions on their patients, and, on the other hand, the patient won’t reveal other irrelevant
information their their surgical professionals. When a record is created, each node within
the record is evaluated by a policy engine, which can be the hospital’s database in our case.
The database determines whether encryption is necessary, and derives a policy and a set
of attribute tags that are appropriate for the record. The operation of the policy engine
is flexible, and can be configured according to institutional requirements. If the record is
marked for encryption, it can be encrypted using ABE ciphertext-policy or encrypted using
a key-policy ABE scheme under a set of attributes identified by the policy engine (These
may include record type, patient age, date, and other non-sensitive attributes related to
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the record).
On the other hand, as we’re interested in the security and privacy-preserving aspect of the
sensitive medical data, there are the following future direction. As current service could
become popular, the third party cloud computing service can provides more powerful ca-
pability of computing the data. When the third party computation is involved, the privacy
and security causes new issues to arise. The hospital may be use the cloud as a service to
maintain the data, while all the medical record will be encrypted in the database. An hon-
est client can still query this untrusted party without revealing his/her information. There
are known technique like Private Information Retrieval (PIR) and Delegation Computation
that can possibly solve this problems. It will be interesting if we could use cloud services
such as Google Health or Microsoft HealthVault to provide our post-surgical computation
for determining all possible complications.
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